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STUDENT NOTES
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS BY
MAIL UNDER THE HAGUE SERVICE
CONVENTION
L. Andrew Cooper*
The United States is one of twenty-eight States bound by the 1965
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents (the Convention).I The Convention provides several
methods through which a plaintiff in one Member State may effect
service of process upon a defendant in another. There is a dispute as
to whether these methods include service of process by direct mail.
Some courts and commentators interpret the Convention to permit a
plaintiff to effect service by mailing service documents directly to the
defendant abroad. Other courts and commentators maintain that the
Convention does not authorize service in this manner. This dispute
raises important questions of judicial economy and international
comity.
To understand the dispute, one first must consider the provisions
of the Convention that unquestionably establish methods of service.
Articles 2 through 6 of the Convention establish a system in which
each nation creates a "Central Authority." The Central Authority re-
ceives, and attempts to satisfy, requests from abroad for service upon
persons within the nation's borders. 2 This procedure is the primary
method envisioned by the Convention, but other methods of service
also are authorized. Article 8 allows service to be obtained through
diplomatic or consular agents.3 Article 9 permits documents to be for-
warded through consular channels to authorities within a contracting
State who are authorized by that State to effect service. 4 Article 19
permits any method of service which is allowed under the internal law
of the nation in which service is effected. 5 In addition, article 10 states
* University of Chicago, A.B. (1983); University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1992.
1. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15,
1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 4 I.L.M. 341 (hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
2. Id. art. 2, 20 U.S.T. at 362, 4 I.L.M. at 341.
3. Id. art. 8, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
4. Id. art. 9, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
5. Id. art. 19, 20 U.S.T. at 365, 4 I.L.M. at 343.
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that:
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention
shall not interfere with
(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, di-
rectly to persons abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent per-
sons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly
through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the
State of destination,
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to
effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers,
officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.
6
In the United States, the federal courts are split over the proper
interpretation of article 10(a). The Second Circuit has held that article
10(a) allows international service of process by mail, as long as the
receiving nation has not explicitly objected to this provision of the
Convention. 7 The Eighth Circuit, however, has ruled that such ser-
vice is not authorized by article 10(a).8 Noting that article 10(a) uses
the word "send," instead of the word "serve" which is used consis-
tently elsewhere in the Convention, the Eighth Circuit has concluded
that only subsequent documents may be mailed, after service has been
obtained using an authorized method.9
In other circuits, the appellate courts have not addressed the con-
troversy. District courts have examined the question, however, and
they have split between the two lines of interpretation. District courts
in the D.C., Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have consistently inter-
preted article 10(a) to permit international service by mail.10 The dis-
trict courts of the First and Tenth Circuits have taken the opposite
position.1 ' Within the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the
various district courts are divided over the issue.
12
6. Id. art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
7. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
8. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989).
9. Id. at 173-74.
10. See Hutchins v. Beneteau (USA) Ltd., No. 89-4806, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1725 (E.D.
La. Feb. 16, 1990); In re All Terrain Vehicles Litig., No. 88-237, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1843
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1989); Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F.Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex.
1988); Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elect. (U.S.A.), 671 F.Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal.
1987); Great Am. Boat Co. v. Alsthom At., Inc.. Nos. 84-0105, 84-5442, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2805 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 1987); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F.Supp. 1182 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
11. Arthur v. Nissei ASB Co., No. 87-2261-0, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7262 (D. Kan. June
22, 1988); Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16 (D. Me. 1987).
12. Within the Fourth Circuit, for a discussion interpreting article 10(a) to authorize mail
service, see Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., 128 F.R.D. 638 (D.S.C. 1989); Weight v. Kawasaki
Heavy Indus., 597 F.Supp. 1082 (E.D. Va. 1984); cf. Flemming v. Yamaha Motor Corp., No.
900130-A, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14277 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 1991). For cases in the Seventh
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State courts also are divided on the question of international ser-
vice by mail. An early, influential California case held that article
10(a) authorizes service by direct mail. 13 A subsequent decision by a
different California appellate court forcefully advanced the contrary
holding. 14 New York and Arizona courts have held that article 10
does not permit mail service. 15 State courts in Maryland and North
Carolina, on the other hand, interpret the treaty provision to allow the
direct mailing of service upon international defendants.16
No consensus among legal commentators has emerged regarding
mail service under article 10(a). Moore's Federal Practice and Proce-
dure acknowledges the dispute without taking a position on it.17
Wright and Miller's Federal Practice and Procedure does not explicitly
address the Convention, but maintains that service by mail "may be
less objectionable" than more formal methods of service between inter-
national litigants.' 8 While Bruno Ristau's International Judicial
Assistance argues that mail service is permitted under article 10(a),
other commentators have maintained the opposite position with equal
force. 19
The controversy over article 10(a) is an important one. Compared
to service by mail, the Convention's more formal methods of obtaining
service are expensive and time-consuming. 20 The controversy is also
important because it implicates the principles of international comity
and judicial economy. When U.S. courts permit service by mail under
Circuit interpreting the article to allow mail service, see Chowaniec v. Heyl Truck Lines, No. 90-
C-07034, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8138 (N.D. Il1. June 17, 1991); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D.
194 (N.D. I11. 1985); cf. General Electro Music Corp. v. Samic Music Corp., No. 90-C-5590
(1991), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11905 (N.D. II1. Aug. 27, 1991). In the Eleventh Circuit see
Patty v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 4:-91-v-62-HLM (1991), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16561 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 17, 1991); Coblentz GMC/Freightliner v. General Motors Corp., 724 F.Supp. 1364
(M.D. Ala. 1989). Both cases hold that article 10(a) permits mail service. But cf. Wasden v.
Yamaha Motor co., 131 F.R.D. 206 (M.D. Fla. 1990); McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp. U.S.A.,
726 F.Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1989); Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464 (S.D. Miss.
1986).
13. See Shoei Kako Co. v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808 (1973).
14. See Suzuki Motor Co. v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476 (1988).
15. See Kadota v. Hosogai, 608 P.2d 68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Reynolds v. Koh, 490
N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985); Ordmandy v. Lynn, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1984).
16. See Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 566 A.2d 135 (Md. Ct. App. 1989); Hayes v.
Evergo Tel. Co., 397 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
17. JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6.19, n.3
(1991).
18. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
377 (1987).
19. BRUNO RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
148-49 (1990). But see Peter D. Trooboff, International Decisions, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 816, 819
(1988).
20. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, at 564.
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article 10(a), but other States interpret the provision not to authorize
that method of service and object to service by mail on their citizens,
international comity is breached. 2' In addition, the controversy over
article 10(a) impedes judicial economy, by perpetuating an uncertain
rule of procedure for litigants and courts. 2
2
This Note addresses the article 10(a) controversy and argues that
the provision should be interpreted as not authorizing service by mail.
Part I establishes that application of the Convention is mandatory,
and that it supersedes inconsistent methods of service authorized by
federal or state law. Part I then discusses the proper methods of inter-
preting international treaties. Part II applies these methods of treaty
interpretation to the article 10(a) controversy, and argues that the arti-
cle does not authorize service by mail. Part III addresses other con-
siderations for courts and practitioners, including the availability of
mail service under article 19 whenever mail service is permitted by the
internal law of the receiving nation. Part III argues that such consid-
erations favor interpreting article 10(a) not to authorize service of pro-
cess by mail.
I. MANDATORY NATURE OF THE CONVENTION AND METHODS
OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
A. Mandatory Nature of the Convention
Article 1 states that the Convention "shall apply in all cases, in
civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judi-
cial or extrajudicial document for service abroad. ' 23 In Societe Na-
tionale v. U.S. District Court, the U.S. Supreme Court described this
language as "mandatory," meaning that the Convention not only
permits, but requires, the use of its procedures by litigants effecting
service abroad. 24 In a subsequent case, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-
schaft v. Schlunk, the Court further declared that by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Convention "pre-
empts inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in all
cases to which it applies."
'25
Societe Nationale and Schlunk have quieted, but not completely
resolved, a debate in the lower courts over the relationship between
the Convention and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). Rule 4(i)
authorizes several means of effecting service abroad, including direct
21. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion related to this area, see infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
23. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, 20 U.S.T. at 362, 4 I.L.M. at 341.
24. Societe Nationale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 534 n,15 (1987).
25. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
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mail service, which in some cases would conflict with the procedures
authorized by the Convention. 26 Schlunk established that the Conven-
tion supersedes inconsistent procedures authorized by state law, but it
did not explicitly address the apparent conflict between the Conven-
tion and Rule 4(i).27
As a federal statute, Rule 4(i) is given equal dignity with treaties
entered into by the United States; the apparent conflict between the
Rule and the Convention must therefore be examined. 28 Courts ad-
dressing this conflict have noted that the Convention was ratified in
1967, long after the 1938 enactment of Rule 4. Reasoning that the
Convention represented an updated congressional intent, these courts
concluded that the Convention superseded the Rule. 29 In 1983, Con-
gress amended Rule 4 and several courts entertained an argument that
the Convention had, in turn, been superseded by the new version of
Rule 4.30 Were this "latter in time" analysis to govern the issue, mail
service might be permitted under Rule 4(i) even if the Convention did
not allow such service.
A more reasoned analysis, however, rejects the "latter in time" ap-
proach as being overly simplistic. Recognizing that Congress may en-
act new laws without having examined prior inconsistent legislation,
some courts have attempted to read the Convention and Rule 4(i) in
unison so that the legislature's true intent might be discovered. 31
Courts taking this approach note that while the Federal Rules are gen-
eral in nature, the Convention is specific, defining how service of pro-
cess may be made in nations which have agreed to be bound by the
treaty. 32 Under this analysis, Rule 4(i) provides methods of service
which may be used only if they are not prohibited by the
Convention. 3
3
This view of the relationship between the Convention and Rule 4(i)
is particularly compelling when one considers article 19 of the Con-
vention. Article 19 provides that:
To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits
methods of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(I)(D).
27. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S 694 (1988).
28. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
29. See, e.g., Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1983).
30. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986).
31. See, e.g., Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Chem. Serv., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La.
1984).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 777-78.
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articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within its terri-
tory, the present Convention shall not affect such provisions.
34
This article was included in the Convention at the request of the U.S.
delegation.3 5 The delegation wanted article 19 included in the Con-
vention to ensure that the treaty would not repeal the internal proce-
dures in effect for service of foreign documents within the United
States.36 In light of article 19, there is no inconsistency in Congress's
decision to both ratify the Convention and enact Rule 4(i): the Fed-
eral Rule has effect only to the extent its procedures are not prohibited
by the treaty.
Documents coming from abroad, into the United States, may be
served in accordance with Rule 4(i), and documents coming from the
United States may be served, in accordance with Rule 4(i), into States
which are not parties to the Convention. To obtain service in a State
which is a convention member, however, litigants must follow a proce-
dure authorized by the Convention. The Convention therefore super-
sedes inconsistent service authorized either by state law or Rule 4(i).
The question remains, however, whether article 10(a) authorizes ser-
vice abroad by mail. In order to address this question, the proper
methods of treaty interpretation should first be reviewed.
B. Methods of Treaty Interpretation
The U.S. Supreme Court has established a number of principles to
govern the manner in which U.S. courts interpret international trea-
ties. According to the Court, an international treaty is "in the nature
of a contract between nations. ' '3 7 In interpreting treaties, "[g]eneral
rules of construction apply."38 An interpretation, therefore, should
begin "with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written
words are used."' 39 Furthermore, "[o]ther general rules of construc-
tion may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages." 4
With regard to such passages, courts should "look beyond the written
words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties. '4
1
These principles of treaty interpretation, announced by the U.S.
34. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 19,,20 U.S.T. at 365, 4 I.L.M. at 343.
35. 113 CONG. REC. 9404 (1967).
36. Id.
37. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984), reh'g denied 467
U.S. 1231 (1984).
38. Id. at 262 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
40. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
41. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
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Supreme Court, closely parallel those set out in the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties.42 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
states that a treaty shall be interpreted "in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose. '43 Where the meaning of
the treaty passage is ambiguous or obscure, article 32 provides that
recourse may be made to preparatory works of the treaty and the cir-
cumstances in which it was concluded.
44
The United States has yet to ratify the Vienna Convention, but the
U.S. Department of State has said that its provisions are "already rec-
ognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and prac-
tice."'45 Thus, international law is in accord with the principles set out
by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding treaty interpretation. Interpre-
tation turns on the treaty's text, its negotiating history, the construc-
tion afforded by the parties to the treaty, and the general purposes of
the treaty.
II. EXAMINING ARTICLE 10(a) IN LIGHT OF METHODS OF
TREATY INTERPRETATION
The principles of treaty interpretation discussed in Part I may shed
light on article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention. Before apply-
ing them, however, it should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted other aspects of the Convention and has, in dicta,
hinted at an interpretation of article 10(a).
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk involved a claim
brought in an Illinois state court.46 The plaintiff served a complaint
upon the U.S. subsidiary of a German corporation. The corporation
argued that service of process was not in accordance with the Conven-
tion. Noting that Illinois law permitted service to be made upon the
corporation's U.S. subsidiary, the Supreme Court held that the Con-
vention was inapplicable.47 The Convention was implicated only by
international service of process, and, the Court reasoned, the law of
the forum determined whether "service abroad" was required. 4
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, took issue with the ma-
42. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
43. Id. art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at 691-92.
44. Id. art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at 692.
45. S. EXEC. Doc. L., 92d Cong. 1st Sess., at 1 (1971).
46. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengessellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 697 (1988).
47. Id. at 706-08.
48. Id. at 707.
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jority's reasoning. He argued that the majority opinion would allow
contracting States to ignore the Convention's terms entirely. 49 To il-
lustrate his point, Justice Brennan stated that under the majority's
analysis, "a forum nation could prescribe direct mail service to any
foreigner and deem service effective upon deposit in the mailbox." 0
While not examining article 10(a) in any detail, Justice Brennan's il-
lustration suggests that he believed direct mail service was not permit-
ted by the Convention.
51
Except for this thin reed of dicta, the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed service by mail under the Convention. Article 10(a) has, how-
ever, been examined by several federal circuit courts, a multitude of
federal district courts, and a number of state courts. The arguments of
these courts, and of legal commentators, are most effectively examined
by grouping them within the various methods of treaty interpretation
described in Part I of this Note. This Part, therefore, will consider the
interpretations of article 10(a) in light of the Convention's text, its ne-
gotiating history, the constructions afforded by the contracting States,
and the purpose of the article within the Convention.
A. Text of the Convention
Courts that interpret article 10(a) as not authorizing direct mail
service focus on the text of the Convention. They hold that the word
"send" in article 10(a) does not have the same meaning as "service of
process."' 52 These courts note that in other provisions of the Conven-
tion, the word "service" is consistently used to describe authorized
methods of transmitting an initial summons and complaint. 53 The
courts point out that the equally authentic French version of the Con-
vention also uses a different word in article 10(a) than in other provi-
sions of the Convention.
54
In addition, these courts note that when a legislative body "in-
cludes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that [the
legislative body] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate in-
clusion or exclusion."' 55 These courts conclude that "[i]f the drafters
of the Convention had meant for subparagraph (a) to provide an addi-
49. Id. at 710 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Trooboff, supra note 19, at 819.
52. See, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1989).
53. Id.
54. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 697 (1988).
55. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d at 174 (citing favorably Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
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tional manner of service of judicial documents ... they would have
used the word 'service.' "56 Article 10(a) "merely provides a method
for sending subsequent documents after service of process has been
obtained" by one of the means clearly authorized by the Convention. 57
This reasoning is particularly compelling when one observes that
within article 10 itself, the distinction between the "send" and "serve"
language is present. Where article 10(a) addresses the freedom to
"send" judicial documents by postal channels, articles 10(b) and 10(c)
discuss the freedom to "effect service."' 58 As one court has stated, "it
strains plausibility that the Convention's drafters would use the word
'send' in article 10(a) to mean service of process, when they so care-
fully used the word 'service' in 10(b) and (c)." 59
The text of the Convention, therefore, strongly favors the interpre-
tation of those who maintain that article 10(a) does not authorize ser-
vice of process by mail. Those courts that take the opposite position
- that direct mail service is permitted by the Convention - can only
attribute the "send" and "serve" language to "careless drafting. ' ' 6"
They then look to the negotiating history of the Convention to support
their theory. 6'
B. Negotiating History of the Convention
The courts which have attributed article 10(a)'s ambiguous lan-
guage to "careless drafting" are numerous. 62 In advancing this the-
ory, they cite the explanation of Bruno Ristau, who discussed article
10(a)'s negotiating history in his International Judicial Assistance.63
Ristau's analysis begins with the Rapporteur's report on the Conven-
tion's final text. This report was adopted by the delegates at the
Hague Conference." 4 The report states that "except for minor
changes, article 10 of the Convention corresponds to article 10 of the
draft convention. '65
56. Id. at 173-74.
57. Id. at 174.
58. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
59. McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 726 F.Supp. 822, 826 (N.D. Fla. 1989); see
also Hantover Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. of Volentieri & Co., 688 F.Supp. 1377, 1385 (W.D. Mo.
1988).
60. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., id.; Chowaniec v. Heyl Truck Lines, No. 90-C-07034, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8138, at *7 (N.D. 11. June 17, 1991); Hutchins v. Beneteau (USA) Ltd., No. 89-4806, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1725, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 16, 1990); Smith v. Daninchi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680
F.Supp. 847, 850 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
63. RISTAU, supra note 19, at 148-49.
64. Id. at 149; see also text accompanying note 66 infra.
65. RISTAU, supra note 19, at 149.
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The draft convention, in turn, had been accompanied by another,
earlier report. 66 This earlier report discussed the draft convention's
article 10 in terms which suggest service by mail was to be permitted.
As Ristau translated the earlier report:
a) Postal channels. (para.1)
Paragraph 1 [designated "(a)" in the final text] of article 10 corresponds
to paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the 1954 Convention. Throughout, the
term "interested parties" used in the latter convention to designate the
addressee has been substituted with the term persons, which is more
definite.
In paragraph 1 of Article 10 the reference is intended to be to private
persons; that expression also includes persons who are competent to rep-
resent parties for purposes of service [notification], such as English
solicitors.
Moreover, it should be understood that private persons includes indi-
viduals as well as juristic persons.
The provision of paragraph 1 also permits service [notification] by
telegram if the state where service [notification] is to be made does not
object.
The Commission did not accept the proposal that postal channels be
limited to registered mail.
It should be stressed that in permitting the utilization of postal chan-
nels, provided the state of destination does not object, the draft conven-
tion did not intend to pass on the validity of this mode of transmission
under the law of the forum state: in order for the postal channel to be
utilized, it is necessary that it be authorized by the law of the forum
state. That is the reason why under the 1954 Convention Belgian docu-
ments could be served [notifies] in France by postal channels, because
such manner of service [notification] was authorized by Belgian law and
France did not object to it, although French documents, however could
not be similarly serviced [notifies] in Belgium by postal channels, even
though Belgium did not object to it, because such manner of service [no-
tification] was unknown under French law.
67
In light of this report on the draft convention, Ristau concluded
that "[i]t would appear that the draftsmen of the Convention intended
the language 'to send judicial documents, by postal channels' to in-
clude the service of process. The use of different terms in the several
paragraphs of Article 10 may well be attributed to careless drafting. ' 6
While Ristau makes a plausible case for his interpretation of article
10(a), there are several flaws in his analysis. First, Ristau assumes
that the report of the final Convention, which was adopted by the
Hague Conference, incorporated the terms of the earlier report on the
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ments involved here: the final Convention, the report on the final
Convention, the draft convention, and the report on the draft conven-
tion. At the Hague Conference, the delegates of the contracting States
voted only on the final Convention and the report on the final Conven-
tion.69 Because the report on the final Convention states that the final
Convention's article 10 essentially corresponds to the draft conven-
tion's article 10, the terms of the draft convention are, in a sense, in-
corporated into the report on the final Convention. 70 It is not clear,
however, that the terms of the report on the draft convention were also
to be incorporated in this fashion.
At most, Ristau's analysis of the four documents shows that some
of the people involved in drafting the treaty understood article 10(a) to
permit service of process by mail. His analysis does not establish that
there was a "meeting of the minds" on this issue; other delegates may
have understood the provision to refer only to the mailing of docu-
ments after service had been accomplished. When these delegates
voted to approve the report on the final Convention, which equated
the final article 10 with its earlier draft, they may have merely com-
pared the nearly identical draft and final texts of the treaty, without
examining the more illuminating report on the draft convention. The
two groups of delegates may have retained their own understanding of
article 10(a), ignorant even of the existence of any disagreement over
the provision.
Another flaw in Ristau's analysis of the Convention's negotiating
history is that it ignores a related method of treaty interpretation, the
examination of the construction used by the parties. Since an analysis
of negotiating history is essentially an attempt to discover the intent of
the contracting States, that analysis should be informed by the manner
in which the States have treated the disputed treaty language.
C. Construction Adopted by the Contracting States
Article 21 of the Convention permits the contracting States to ob-
ject to certain provisions of the Convention. 7' The entry of such ob-
jections means that the State is not bound by the provisions to which it
objects.72 With regard to article 10(a), the contracting States may be
classed in three groups: those that objected to the article, those that
did not object to the article and permit mail service from abroad in
their internal laws, and those that did not object to the article but do
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 21, 20 U.S.T. at 365, 4 I.L.M. at 343.
72. Id.
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not permit mail service from abroad in their internal laws. States that
represent each of these three groups are, respectively, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, the United States, and Japan.
73
1. The Construction by the Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany has objected to all of article 10,
including paragraph (a).74 Germany, like most civil law countries,
does not permit direct mail service under its internal laws.75 It consid-
ers service of process to be a sovereign act. 76 When service is at-
tempted from abroad, Germany does not object if copies of service
documents are mailed for informational purposes only, as long as no
legal consequences follow. 77 Service itself must be obtained through
one of the more formal methods authorized by the Convention.
78
Because Germany objected to article 10(a), it could be argued that
Germany interprets the article's language to provide for service by
mail. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Germany may have
interpreted article 10(a) to refer to documents mailed after service has
been obtained, and objected to this type of mailing as well. The terms
by which Germany expressed its objection to the article suggest ex-
actly this interpretation.
In expressing its objection to article 10, Germany referred to
"methods of transmission" as well as "service."' 79 Other civil law
countries expressed their objections in similar terms. Norway objected
to "such methods of service or transmission of documents on its terri-
tory as mentioned in articles 8 and 10 of the Convention."80 Articles
8, 10(b), and 10(c) explicitly deal with "service"; Norway's distinction
between service and transmission therefore may reflect a belief that
article 10(a) deals with transmission of documents after service has
been obtained. Egypt also objected to the "methods of transmitting"
documents under article 10.81 Each of these nations may interpret ar-
73. See infra notes 74-110 and accompanying text.
74. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 21, 20 U.S.T. at 365, 4 I.L.M. at 343.
75. WILLIAM D. PARK & STEPHEN J. CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
414-15 (1990).
76. Id.
77. Reports on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
17 I.L.M. 312, 317 (1978) [hereinafter 1977 Special Commission Report].
78. See supra notes 2, 4, 5, and accompanying text.
79. Comments to FED. R. CIv. P. 4(i) (noting reservations to Hague Service Convention,
supra note 1, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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ticles 10(b) and (c) to authorize methods of service, but article 10(a) to
pertain only to the sending of non-service documents.
2. The U.S. Construction of Article 10(a)
The internal law of the United States permits mail service from
abroad. Under the U.S. Constitution and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, direct mail service may be used in both domestic and inter-
national litigation. 2 It is not clear, however, how the United States
officially construes the language of article 10(a). The fact that the
United States expressed no reservations to article 10(a) does not neces-
sarily mean that the United States interprets the provision to be as
broad as its internal law. The pronouncements of the U.S. govern-
ment must be studied to determine whether an official interpretation
has emerged.
When the U.S. State Department submitted the Convention to the
Senate for advice and consent, no remarks in the ensuing hearings
were specifically directed towards the interpretation of article 10.83
The Convention is self-executing, meaning that once the treaty was
ratified, no further legislative act was required to incorporate the
treaty into the internal law of the United States.84 The U.S. delegation
to the Convention did report to Congress that the treaty would require
"little change in the present procedures in the United States." These
remarks, however, appear to have been addressed to concerns that the
Convention might affect due process principles or expand judicial
assistance to foreigners.8 5 It is unlikely that such general assurances
to Congress were specifically addressed to the issue of service by
mail.86 There is little in Congress's behavior at the time of ratification
to suggest an interpretation of article 10(a).
It is also difficult to draw inferences from the behavior of Congress
subsequent to the treaty's ratification. The Convention was ratified in
1969.87 Since then, Congress has continued to authorize service
abroad by direct mail in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.88 Be-
cause Congress has not changed this aspect of the Federal Rules, a
number of courts have reasoned that the Rules must already be in
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950).
83. See S. Doc. C, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
84. See Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1983); DeJames v.
Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
85. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 11 (1967).
86. See generally id.
87. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, 20 U.S.T. at 365, 4 I.L.M. at 343.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(D).
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accord with the Convention, and that the Convention therefore must
allow mail service under article 10(a).89 It is doubtful, however, that
Congress's inaction on the Federal Rules represents a conscious deci-
sion that those Rules are in accord with the Convention. In such in-
stances of legislative inaction, it is often the case that the legislative
body has simply failed to address a conflict between laws.90
Moreover, the inclusion of article 19 in the Convention, which was
inserted at the request of the United States, indicates that Congress
could allow the Federal Rules to continue to permit mail service even
while interpreting article 10(a) not to provide for mail service.91 Arti-
cle 19 states that if "the internal law of a contracting State permits
methods of transmission, other than those provided for in the preced-
ing articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within its
territory, the present Convention shall not affect such provisions. '9
2
Thus, the Convention itself allows Congress to authorize, in the Fed-
eral Rules, service from abroad by direct mail even if such service is
not authorized by the Convention.
The U.S. State Department has indicated, in a letter to the Admin-
istrative Office of United States Courts and the National Center for
State Courts, that it interprets article 10(a) to permit service abroad by
mail.93 In the United States, treaty interpretations of the Executive
Branch are given weight by the courts.94 The courts, however, are the
final authority on the interpretation of treaties as law. 95 The split in
the U.S. courts over the correct interpretation of article 10(a) suggests
that in the United States, a definitive construction has not emerged.
3. The Construction by Japan
Japan has not objected to article 10(a).96 Japan's internal law,
however, does not authorize service of process through ordinary postal
channels. 97 Like other civil law nations, Japan regards service of pro-
89. See Shoei Kako Co. Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 821 (1973).
90. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 286 (1990).
91. 113 CONG. REC. 9404 (1967).
92. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 19, 20 U.S.T. at 365, 4 I.L.M. at 343.
93. United States Department of State Opinion Regarding the Bankston Case and Service by
Mail to Japan Under the Hague Service Convention, 30 I.L.M. 260 (1991) [hereinafter State De-
partment Opinion Regarding the Bankston Case].
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326(2) (1986).
95. Id.
96. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 365, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
97. See Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989); Suzuki Motor
Co. v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 1481 (1988) (citing Robert W.
Peterson, Jurisdiction and the Japanese Defendant, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 555, 563 (1985)).
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cess as a sovereign act.98 Consequently, Japanese law requires service
to be made through government officials. 99 As one commentator has
explained:
When process is served by mail in Japan, the court clerk uses a special
form of mail. The court clerk stamps the outside of the envelope with a
notice of special service ("tokubetsu sootatsu"). The mail-carrier acts as
a special officer of the court by recording the proof of delivery on a spe-
cial proof of service form and returning it to the court clerk. 1oo
The fact that Japan's internal law proscribes direct mail service
makes it unlikely that Japan would intend to allow foreign litigants to
effect service on persons within its borders using this method. More-
over, Japan objected to the relatively more formal service methods set
out in articles 10(b) and 10(c).' 10 Because Japan objected to those
provisions but not to article 10(a), it is unlikely that Japan interprets
article 10(a) as authorizing an additional method of service.' 0 2
Indeed, authorities on Japanese law insist that Japan's failure to
object to article 10(a) does not mean that mail service into Japan is
authorized. 103 These authorities stress that article 175 of Japan's Code
of Civil Procedure does not authorize direct mail service abroad. This
aspect of Japanese law was not altered by Japan's ratification of the
Convention, these authorities continue, because in Japan a ratified
multinational treaty is not self-executing. 1 4 A Japanese national
therefore cannot use direct mail service in a foreign nation. "[F]rom
the viewpoint of reciprocity," these authorities conclude, Japan does
not permit direct mail service from abroad into Japan. 105 Japan's fail-
ure to object to article 10(a) thus does not mean that Japan has con-
sented to service by direct mail from abroad.106
Some courts have argued that, since ratifying the Convention, Ja-
pan has probably become aware that U.S. courts interpret article 10(a)
98. Peterson, supra note 97, at 577.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
102. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989); Suzuki Motor Co.
v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 1481 (1988).
103. Yasuhiro Fujita, Service of American Process Upon Japanese Nationals By Registered
Airmail and Enforceability of Resulting American Judgments in Japan, 12 LAW IN JAPAN: AN
ANNUAL 69 (1979); William T. Jorden, Beyond Jingoism, Service By Mail To Japan and the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 16 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 69 (1983); Yoshio Ohara, Japanese Law
and Practice in Transnational Litigation, 23 INT'L LAW. 10 (1989).
104. Ohara, supra note 103, at 14.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 15; see also E. Charles Routh, Litigation Between Japanese and American Parties,
in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 188, 190-91 (John
0. Haley ed., 1978).
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to authorize direct service by mail. These courts contend that Japan's
failure to subsequently object to the provision indicates that it is recep-
tive to that method of service.' 0 7 There are several flaws in this rea-
soning. First, Japan is not bound by the interpretations of U.S. courts
and is not required to base its treaty objections on those interpreta-
tions. Second, many U.S. courts interpret article 10(a) not to author-
ize mail service; it is unreasonable to expect Japan to respond to the
interpretations of U.S. courts when the U.S. courts are split over the
issue. Third, Japan has stated that its failure to object to article 10(a)
does not constitute consent to direct mail service.108 This statement
was made by Japan's delegates to the 1989 Hague Service Conference.
The delegates were responding to efforts by the U.S. Departments of
State and Justice to elicit a more precise position from Japan on the
question of service by mail from other contracting States. 109 The Jap-
anese delegation explained:
Japan has not declared that it objects to the sending of judicial docu-
ments, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad. In this connec-
tion, Japan (in an April 1989 statement) has made it clear that no
objection to the use of postal channels for sending judicial documents to
persons in Japan does not necessarily imply that the sending by such a
method is considered a valid service in Japan; it merely indicates that
Japan does not consider it as an infringement of its sovereign power.110
This statement suggests that while Japan does not believe its sover-
eignty is violated when judicial documents are mailed from abroad
directly to persons in Japan, it does not agree that documents mailed
in this manner constitute effective service. Thus it appears that Japan
does not interpret article 10(a) to authorize service of process through
postal channels.
D. Purpose of Article 10 Within the Convention
In the article 10(a) controversy, advocates of each of the two inter-
pretations have sought to use the general purpose of the Convention to
advance their arguments. Those who interpret the provision to allow
mail service contend that such service is consistent with the Conven-
tion's goal of "simplifying and expediting" service procedures.III
Those taking the opposite position maintain that a key purpose of the
Convention was to establish formal means of service, and that it would
107. See, e.g., Patty v. Toyota Motor Corp., 777 F.Supp. 956 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
108. See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission Report on the
Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence Convention, 28 I.L.M. 1556,
1561 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Special Commission Report].
109. State Department Opinion Regarding the Bankston Case, supra note 93, at 261.
110. 1989 Special Commission Report, supra note 108, at 1561.
111. Shoei Kako Co. Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808 (1973).
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be inconsistent with that purpose to allow litigants to entirely avoid
the use of those mechanisms by effecting service directly through the
mails.' 1 2 The purposes of the Convention are general enough to sup-
port either conclusion.
It may be helpful, therefore, to look not at the purpose of the Con-
vention as a whole, but instead at the purpose of article 10 within the
Convention. The article states that "[p]rovided the State of destina-
tion does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with"
the "freedom" to take the actions described in subparagraphs (a), (b),
and (c). i" 3 Given this discussion of noninterference with apparently
preexisting "freedoms," contracting States may have construed article
10(a) not to create new procedures, but merely to perpetuate existing
ones. Because the civil law nations did not permit service by mail in
their internal laws, they, during treaty negotiations, may not have re-
garded article 10(a) as authorizing mail service."
4
The negotiating history of the Convention, the construction of arti-
cle 10(a) afforded by the contracting States, and the purposes of the
Convention, when used to interpret the controversial article, are, at
best, inconclusive. The language of the text itself, however, leads to
only one conclusion. Examining the language of article 10(a) strongly
suggests that the provision was not intended to authorize service
abroad by mail.
III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR COURTS AND PRACTITIONERS
Part II of this Note demonstrates that, as a matter of treaty inter-
pretation, article 10(a) does not authorize service of process by mail.
This Part will present additional reasons for courts and practitioners
to construe article 10(a) in this manner. For analytical purposes, a
general distinction may be drawn between those considerations which
primarily concern courts and those which primarily concern practi-
tioners. Each of the considerations, however, may be of value to
judges and litigants alike.
A. Considerations for Courts
1. Comity
In adjudicating legal disputes with international dimensions, the
promotion of comity is a well established and important consideration.
The principle of comity entails the willingness of one State to recog-
nize the sovereign acts of other States, not as a matter of right, but out
112. See Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 18 (D. Me. 1987).
113. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
114. See 1977 Special Commission Report, supra note 77, at 317.
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of deference and good will."15 Promoting comity is a goal of the
Hague Service Convention: the treaty is designed to ensure that inter-
national service will not be objectionable to the State in which service
is made." 16
Comity is best promoted by interpreting article 10(a) to not au-
thorize mail service. States which do not object to direct mail service
will not be offended if its citizens are nevertheless served using a non-
postal method of service clearly authorized by the Convention. On the
other hand, States which do object to service by mail may be offended
when U.S. courts recognize mail service upon persons residing within
those States' borders. As long as ambiguity remains over the article
10(a) language, comity requires that U.S. courts interpret that lan-
guage not to permit service by mail.
2. Opportunity to Cure Service
Plaintiffs are not unduly prejudiced when courts invalidate mail
service under article 10(a). Normally, the plaintiff's case is not dis-
missed.' 7 Instead, service is "quashed" and the plaintiff is given the
opportunity to cure service upon the defendant. "8 As long as the ini-
tial attempt at service was made before the statute of limitations ex-
pired, the cured service will relate back to the earlier date of attempted
service, and the plaintiff's case will proceed.' 19 Nothing in the Con-
vention prohibits U.S. courts from allowing plaintiffs to cure defective
service.' 20 The Convention's terms may therefore be viewed as com-
plementary to the general and flexible scheme of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.' 21 This is particularly true, as one court has ob-
served, "where no injustice or prejudice is likely to result to the party
located abroad, or to the interests of the affected signatory coun-
try." 22 Thus, plaintiffs making good faith efforts to effect service are
115. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (2d ed.
1987).
116. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
117. See, e.g., Wasden v. Yamaha Motor Co., 131 F.R.D. 206, 210 (M.D. Fla. 1990); McCle-
non v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 726 F.Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Fla. 1989); Pochop v. Toyota
Motor Co., 11 F.R.D. 464, 467 (S.D. Miss 1986).
118. Flemming v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 774 F.Supp 992, 996 (W.D. Va. 1991); General
Electro Music Corp. v. Samic Music Corp. No. 90-C-5590, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11905, at *4
(N.D. 11. Aug. 27, 1991); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. at 446.
119. Vorhees v. Fischer & Frecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (1983).
120. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342;
Fox v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 103 F.R.D. 453, 455 (1984).
121. Fox, 103 F.R.D. at 455.
122. Id.
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afforded the opportunity to cure service defects. 123
3. Cost of Nonpostal Service Methods
Service by mail has been heralded as the least expensive, most con-
venient method of effecting service of process. 124 The Convention's
more formal service methods can cost plaintiffs $800.00 or $900.00
more than service by direct mail. 125 Courts have noted, however, that
the cost is not prohibitive, and may be regarded as a standard litiga-
tion expense.' 26 Moreover, if the plaintiff prevails, he may be entitled
to recover such expenses as part of his judgment.1 27 Courts therefore
should not interpret article 10(a) to authorize mail service merely be-
cause mail service is relatively inexpensive.
Several other cost-related factors should be considered. Exper-
ienced international litigants maintain that when in doubt, several
methods of service should be utilized simultaneously. 28 These liti-
gants reason that the additional cost of duplicative service may be jus-
tified by the certainty that service will be properly obtained.
29
Duplicative service may be especially useful when one of the service
methods utilized depends on postal channels. In some States, mail
service may be unpredictable and time-consuming.1 30 If plaintiffs fol-
low this advice by using mail service in tandem with service through
the Central Authority, they will bear the expense of the formal service
methods even if the courts hold the mail service to be valid under
article 10(a).
4. Potential Disadvantages to U.S. Litigants
In one respect, interpreting article 10(a) not to authorize service by
mail disadvantages U.S. litigants. Arguably, it is unfair for U.S. de-
fendants to be subject to a method of service by foreign plaintiffs
which U.S. plaintiffs cannot employ in effecting service on certain for-
eign defendants. This "unfairness," however, is more the result of ar-
ticle 19 than of any interpretation of article 10. Article 19 provides
123. Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16 (D. Me. 1987); Pochop v. Toyota Motor
Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 467 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Fox, 103 F.R.D. at 455.
124. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, at 564.
125. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989) (Gibson, J.,
concurring).
126. Dunakey v. American Honda Motor Co., 124 F.R.D. 638, 639 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
127. Id.
128. Kenneth B. Reisenfeld, Service of United States Process Abroad. A Practical Guide to
Service Under the Hague Service Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 24 INT'L
LAW. 55 (1990).
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also PARK & CROMIE, supra note 75, at 403.
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that a State may continue to recognize service from abroad when ser-
vice satisfies the State's own laws, even if the service is not otherwise
authorized by the Convention. 13' U.S. service procedures are gener-
ally simpler and more flexible than the procedures of the Conven-
tion.132 "Unfairness" to U.S. plaintiffs, therefore, is inherent in U.S.
law and in the Convention; it is not limited to the issue of direct mail
service. Moreover, it should be noted that the Convention is only "un-
fair" to U.S. plaintiffs vis-i-vis foreign plaintiffs. U.S. plaintiffs are not
disadvantaged in relation to foreign defendants, within the scope of
their own litigation.
B. Considerations for Practitioners
1. Enforcement of Judgments
When a U.S. plaintiff sues a foreign defendant, and prevails in a
U.S. court, the case may not be concluded: if the defendant's assets
are located in the defendant's own State, the plaintiff may require the
cooperation of that State's government in enforcing the judgment.
33
When there is any chance that the State will be offended by the U.S.
court's recognition of the plaintiff's method of service, this increases
the likelihood that the State will not provide the cooperation necessary
to secure the judgment. 34 The plaintiff therefore has an interest in
following the Convention's authorized methods of service. Plaintiffs
should err on the side of caution by choosing a nonpostal method of
service if the defendant's State might object to mail service.
2. Consolidation or Transfer of Litigation
The complex nature of litigation has lead to the adoption of proce-
dures which make possible the consolidation or transfer of civil actions
among U.S. courts. 3 5 When lawsuits filed in different U.S. jurisdic-
tions share common issues or parties, the lawsuits might be consoli-
dated into a single jurisdiction to enhance judicial economy. 136 The
consolidation may occur on a motion by the court, a defendant, or a
third-party plaintiff. 37 Although the plaintiff chooses the jurisdiction
131. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
132. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 4 with Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, 20
U.N.T.S. at 363.
133. David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the
United States, West Germany, and England, LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 325, 340-41 (1987).
134. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 499 (1988) (citing Wes-
tin, supra note 133).
135. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406, 1407i (1991); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND,
§ 31.11 (1985).
136. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND, supra note 135, at § 31.11.
137. Id. § 31.121.
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in which the suit is initially filed, the case ultimately may be resolved
by a jurisdiction not of the plaintiff's choosing.' 38 The possibility of
consolidation or transfer must be kept in mind by the plaintiff who
contemplates international service of process by mail. Even if the
plaintiff intends to file suit in a district court of the Second Circuit,
which would permit the mail service, the defendant or a third party
plaintiff may succeed in transferring or consolidating the litigation into
the Eighth Circuit, which would quash the service.' 39 This risk of
consolidation or transfer is another reason for plaintiffs to regard arti-
cle 10(a) as not authorizing service by mail.
3. Mail Service Still Permitted for Most States Under Article 19
Article 19 of the Convention states: "To the extent that the inter-
nal law of a contracting State permits methods of transmission, other
than those provided for in the preceding articles, of documents coming
from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention
shall not affect such provisions."' t4 This article has been consistently
interpreted to allow service abroad by any means permitted by the
internal law of the State in which service is made. Most courts which
have interpreted article 19 in this manner have done so in a perfunc-
tory fashion, listing article 19 as one of the methods of service author-
ized by the Convention.' 41 Recently, several state courts have
discussed the option of service under article 19 in greater detail.
142
This interpretation of article 19 is not new, however. Writing in 1969,
one commentator clearly indicated his belief that article 19 permits
service of process by any means authorized by the internal law of the
receiving nation. 143
The availability of mail service under article 19 is an additional
reason to interpret article 10(a) to not authorize service of process by
mail. Most States which have not objected to article 10(a) have no
objection to mail service; their internal law permits service by mail. 1'
138. Id.
139. See Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989); Ackermann v.
Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1986).
140. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363, 4 I.L.M. at 342.
141. See, e.g., Bankston, 889 F.2d at 174; Prost v. Honda Motor Co., 122 F.R.D. 215, 216
(E.D. Mo. 1987).
142. See, e.g., Kadota v. Hosogai, 608 P.2d 68, 72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Nicholson v.
Yamaha. 566 A.2d 135, 139 (Md. Ct. App. 1989); Hayes v. Evergo Tele. Co., 397 S.E.2d 325,
327 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Stephen F. Downs, Note, The Effect of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
125, 132 (1969).
144. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
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Therefore even if article 10(a) were interpreted not to authorize mail
service, service could still be effected by direct mail, in most signatory
States, under article 19. Only in States such as Japan, whose internal
law proscribes mail service, would service by mail be prohibited.145
Of course, mail service under article 19 would present some
problems of proof concerning the internal law of the State receiving
the service documents. The U.S. court might-not be sufficiently famil-
iar with the receiving nation's internal laws to take judicial notice of
the availability of mail service. The litigants, however, should be able
to offer evidence concerning the receiving State's internal laws. Be-
cause service is assumed to be proper until challenged by the defend-
ant, the burden would properly be placed on the defendant to
demonstrate that the receiving State's laws do not permit direct service
by mail from abroad. Since the defendant is located in the receiving
State, it is reasonable to expect the defendant to be able to produce
such evidence concerning the receiving State's laws. If the laws of the
receiving State in fact permit service by direct mail from abroad, the
service would be permitted under article 19 of the Convention.
CONCLUSION
The plain language of article 10(a) suggests that the provision does
not authorize service abroad by mail. It merely provides that, to the
extent States do not object, documents may be mailed after service has
been effected. Many of the States which are bound by the Convention
would prefer that mail service be permitted. Several of the contracting
States, however, reject service of process by mail. U.S. courts should
respect the desires of these States, as well as the plain language of
article 10(a), by interpreting the provision not to authorize a method
of service. If the courts adopted this interpretation, litigants would
retain the ability, under article 19, to obtain service by mail in any
contracting State which permits mail service from abroad in its inter-
nal laws.
145. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
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